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THIS HILL AIN’T BIG ENOUGH FOR THE BOTH OF US:
HOW THE FEUD BETWEEN SKIERS AND SNOWBOARDERS
ILLUSTRATES THE INEQUALITY THAT HAS BECOME THE
NORM IN EQUAL PROTECTION LAND ACCESS CLAIMS
“You’d be hard-fought to find two sports, two cultures that are more
similar than skiing and snowboarding.  Our equipment is made in the same
factories, of the same materials.  We live in the same towns, drink at the
same bars, wear the same clothes, date, have sex, get married, and have little
inter-glisse kids together.  We chase the same storms, for the same reasons,
and when they hit, we travel to the same places.  That is, except three.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Sherman Poppen created the first snowboard in the
1960s, there has been a rift between the snowboarding and skiing
communities.2  From the beginning, ski resorts prohibited
snowboarders from using their hills, and so snowboarders were
forced to use rough trails in the backcountry.3  The sport eventually
became more mainstream in 1977, when ski liability insurance be-
gan covering snowboarders.4  However, snowboarding did not
reach relative popularity until the 1980s, when the younger genera-
tion adopted the sport as a way to express rebellious cultural atti-
tudes.5  At a time when skateboarding was taking over the streets,
1. Derek Taylor, The End to Snow-Separatism, POWDERMAG.COM (Apr. 10, 2014),
http://www.powder.com/stories/end-snow-separatism/#YBX6WYUmH96ZTF
vG.97 (commenting on similarities between snowboarders and skiers, and explain-
ing that three ski resorts still ban snowboarding).
2. See Sam Baldwin, Snowboarding Vs Skiing: The Dying Feud, SNOWSPHERE.COM
(Jan. 2006), http://www.snowsphere.com/special-features/snowboarding-vs-skiing
-the-dying-feud (detailing early stages of feud between snowboarders and skiers).
3. See id. (explaining that there were still relatively few snowboarders in the
1960s and 1970s, and that for the most part it was only a “hardcore few” that tried
to develop the sport).
4. See id. (citing “a man named Dimitrije” as the catalyst of this effort); see also
Paul MacArthur, Top Ten Important Moments in Snowboarding History, SMITHSO-
NIAN.COM (Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/the-top-ten-
important-moments-in-snowboarding-history-6851590/?no-ist (summarizing most
important moments in development of snowboarding).  MacArthur explains that
Dimitrije Milovich was a snowboarding pioneer who started the first modern
snowboarding company called Winterstick. See id.
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snowboarding began taking over the slopes.6  The presence of a
younger crowd collided with the established decorum at ski resorts,
and set off the feud that continues to this day.7
The tension between the two sports arises from differences in
their traditional mentalities.8  Skiing has always been a very serious
sport, requiring a substantial investment of time, training, and
money.9  For skiers, having fun means training intensely, not goof-
ing around with friends.10  Resorts themselves were built around
the development of skiing rather than snowboarding, and many ar-
gue that skiing is the more challenging and inherently dangerous
of the two sports.11
On the other hand, snowboarding tends to focus on the pure
joy of riding outdoors rather than commitment to competition.12
Evidence of this mentality is apparent in typical snowboarding at-
tire, which is baggy and non-functional, as opposed to the tight,
aerodynamic attire typically found on skiers.13  Summed up, the
feud exists because “a skier who spent $4,500 on the gear he
strapped to the top of his Audi . . . sees a snowboarder who spent
less than $1000 rolling up in a ‘83 Civic hatchback having more fun
than him.”14
6. See id. (explaining that kids who were interested in skateboarding also be-
came interested in snowboarding).  Skateboarders were known for using “features”
such as curbs and benches when practicing. See id.  This tended not to bother
people that much on the streets, while the same action at private ski resorts caused
much more backlash. See id.
7. See id. (explaining how feud was largely cultural and represented socioeco-
nomic differences).
8. See, e.g., Jack Salathe, Skiers Vs Snowboarders: Why Can’t They Get Along?,
HUBPAGES (Feb. 11, 2011), http://jacksalathe.hubpages.com/hub/Skiers-Vs-Snow
boarders-Why-Cant-They-Get-Along (outlining basic differences between
snowboarding and skiing cultures).
9. See id. (stating skiers’ perspective on their sport).  Skiers are proud of the
value and expense of their equipment. See id.
10. See id.  (discussing how skiers are deathly proud of their sport, seeing it
more as a triumph of nature and less as a leisure activity, and consequently, they
are less open to change).
11. See id. (commenting how some argue that snowboarding may be harder to
master than skiing).
12. See id. (summarizing snowboarders’ perspective on their sport).  Unlike
skiers, snowboarders are more about having fun and so are more accepting of
change and innovation. See id.
13. See id.  (purporting that snowboarders are more concerned about comfort
and appearance than functionality).
14. See id.  (speculating why skiers, who commit so much to their sport, do not
want to see young snowboarders, who are perceived as reckless and low class, enjoy
slopes without putting in same level of commitment). See also Christopher Solo-
mon, Has Snowboarding Lost Its Edge?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2013, at TR1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/20/travel/has-snowboarding-lost-its-edge.html
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Some argue that after more than forty years the feud has all
but died out, due in part to a possible decline in the popularity of
snowboarding, an increase of athletes participating in both sports,
or a general acceptance of the snowboarding culture as a whole.15
However, a recent legal battle in Utah illustrates that the feud is
very much still alive.16  Alta Ski Resort (“Alta”) is a famous resort in
Utah that does not allow snowboarders to use its facilities.17  Last
year, Wasatch Equality (“Wasatch”), a non-profit group represent-
ing snowboarders, brought a constitutional claim against Alta and
the United States Forest Service (“Forest Service”), the lessor of
Alta’s land.18  In Wasatch v. Alta, Wasatch argued that Alta and the
Forest Service were denying snowboarders of their Fourteenth
Amendment right to equal protection and Fifth Amendment right
to due process because Alta and the Forest Service were prohibiting
snowboarders from patronizing Alta or making use of the public
(explaining how in recent decades snowboarding has declined in popularity in
part because sport has become more serious and focused like skiing).
15. See Karen Schwartz, Skiing and Snowboarding: Many People Do Both Now, HUF-
FINGTON POST (Jan. 11, 2012, 2:21 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-
wires/20120111/us-travel-skiers-vs-snowboarders (discussing how as snowboarding
has become more main stream, many winter athletes are participating in both
sports which has led to better understanding between skiing and snowboarding
communities); The Snowboarders vs. Skiers Cold War Is Over, ORLANDO SENTINEL
(Nov. 10, 1996), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/1996-11-10/travel/
9611050801_1_snowboarders-skiers-resorts (explaining how general acceptance of
snowboarding has permeated through ski resorts and general ski culture); Skiers v.
Snowboarders: A Feud in the Past, GRAYS ON TRAYS, http://www.graysontrays.com/
blog/snow-culture/skiers-v-snowboarders-a-feud-in-the-past/ (last visited Sept. 10,
2015) (outlining how emergence of snowboarding as respected sport in main-
stream winter sports culture, as demonstrated by its acceptance into Olympic
games, has led to decline in feud between skiers and snowboarders).
16. See Megan Barber, Snowboarders Sue Alta Ski Resort, the Internet Freaks Out,
CURBED SKI (Jan. 16, 2014, 12:58 PM), http://ski.curbed.com/archives/2014/01/
snowboarders-sue-alta-ski-area-the-internet-freaks-out.php; Lindsey Whitehurst, Ski-
ing vs. Snowboarding: ‘Riders’ Sue Utah Ski Resort that Prohibits Their Sport, MASSLIVE
(Aug. 11, 2014, 10:55 PM), http://www.masslive.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/08/
skiing_vs_snowboarding_riders.html (commenting on 2014 suit against Alta Ski
Resort for not allowing snowboarders to use resort).
17. See About Alta, ALTA, http://www.alta.com/the-mountain/about-alta (last
visited Feb. 4, 2016) (providing information regarding ski resort).
18. See Barber, supra note 16 (reporting on lawsuit); Whitehurst, supra note 16
(reporting on lawsuit); Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351,
1353 (D. Utah 2014).  “Wasatch equality is a Utah based nonprofit working to end
the anti-snowboarding policies that prevent friends and families from exercising
their legal right to enjoy public land, regardless of how they choose to get down
the hill.” Home, WASATCH EQUAL., http://wasatchequality.org (last visited Mar. 13,
2016). See also infra notes 44–59 (describing claim had to be brought against both
Alta and Forest Service because Alta is private entity and equal protections claims
require presence of state actor).
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mountain that the Alta leases from the Forest Service.19  The
United States District Court for the District of Utah granted the
defendants’ motions to dismiss the claim for (1) lack of necessary
government involvement, (2) government exemption from liability,
and (3) sufficient rational basis justification.20
Part II of this Comment discusses the history of ski resorts re-
fusing access to snowboarders, the typical approaches to the consti-
tutional issues presented in the Alta case, and why the Alta case
serves as a proper case study in reevaluating standard judicial ap-
proaches.21  Part III analyzes and critiques the Utah District Court’s
use of the prevailing standards of review and suggests alternative
standards that are more equitable.22  Part IV concludes that the out-
come of Wasatch reaffirms the need to employ alternate standards
of review in equal protection claims that deal with land access, pri-
vate parties, and rational basis review.23
II. DISCRIMINATION AT SKI RESORTS AND THE LAND ACCESS
PROBLEM
A. The Uphill Battle for Snowboarders at Ski Resorts
Ski resorts have been the battlefield for the war between skiers
and snowboarders.24  Ski resorts around the world banned
snowboarders when the sport was introduced in the 1970s.25  As a
result, snowboarders had to use hills that were wild and untamed in
areas known as the “backcountry.”26  As time passed, snowboarders
19. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (explaining that Alta is private
resort that owns facilities but leases mountain from United States government).
20. See id. at 1370 (explaining how both Alta and Forest Service submitted
motions to dismiss, but that District Court would mainly on content of Forest Ser-
vice’s motion).  For the purposes of this comment, the arguments of both defend-
ants will be considered as one. See id. But see Ben Winslow, The 10th Circuit Will
Hear Arguments over Alta’s Snowboarding Ban, FOX 13 SALT LAKE CITY (Oct. 5, 2015,
10:11 AM), http://fox13now.com/2015/10/05/the-10th-circuit-court-will-hear-ar-
guments-over-altas-snowboarding-ban/ (explaining that 10th Circuit, which ini-
tially dismissed Wasatch’s claim, later decided to hear claim).  Unfortunately, this
ruling will not be available prior to the publication of this comment, but it should
be noted that the court may use the same analysis addressed in this comment. See
id.
21. See infra notes 24–93 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 95–211 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 215–29 and accompanying text.
24. See Baldwin, supra note 2 (outlining challenges snowboarders have faced
since they began trying to use resort slopes).
25. See id. (listing challenges that snowboarders faced during early years of
sport’s development).
26. See id. (describing backcountry as slopes not maintained by any resort, but
rather naturally existing).
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were gradually able to start using better-maintained hills at private
resorts.27  However, not all resorts followed this trend, and some
resorts still rejected snowboarders at their destinations.28  In addi-
tion to Alta, there are two other resorts in North America that pro-
hibit snowboarding: Deer Valley Ski Resort in Utah and Mad River
Glen Ski Resort in Vermont.29
These three resorts maintain that their policies against
snowboarding are a marketing angle that attracts a certain clientele
and provides a unique experience.30  Unlike Deer Valley and Alta,
Mad River Glen is somewhat of an outlier because its exclusiveness
is based more on preserving its quirky style than anything else.31
The sense of elitism attached to skiing is therefore not as relevant as
with Deer Valley and Alta, who both cater to a more affluent
crowd.32  Mad River Glen, citing its traditional ski lift design that
does not accommodate snowboards, likely has the most viable justi-
fication for prohibiting snowboarders.33  However, the other two re-
sorts are more modern and lack unique logistical issues, making
their policies especially questionable.34
Snowboarders have not been silent on the issue, as demon-
strated by Burton’s 2008 “Sabotage Stupidity” campaign.35  The
27. See id. (explaining that during later part of the 20th century, many resorts
began accommodating snowboarders, and even providing special terrain parks
geared towards snowboarders).  In the beginning of the 1980s, less than 10% of
resorts allowed snowboarders, but now most resorts do allow snowboarders. See id.
Increased revenue was a major factor in this shift, not just general acceptance of
the sport. See id.
28. See Barber, supra note 16 (discussing ski-only resorts); Whitehurst, supra
note 16 (discussing small amount of ski resorts which still ban snowboarders).
29. See id. (noting that Alta is only of three resorts that leases public land).
30. See Snowboarders Sue to Gain Access to Skiers-Only Resort, NEW YORK POST
(Nov. 17, 2015, 9:26 AM), http://nypost.com/2015/11/17/snowboarders-sue-to-
gain-access-to-skiers-only-resort/ (reiterating stated purpose for why resorts ban
snowboarders); see also Christopher Del Sole, NO Snowboards Allowed!, ABOUT.COM,
http://snowboarding.about.com/od/snowboardresorts/i/snowboardingban.htm
(last updated Jan. 30, 2016) (identifying impetus for ski resorts that still ban
snowboarding).
31. See Bill Pennington, A Quirky Mountain is Keeping Its Quirks, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 9, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/09/travel/escapes/09ski.ready
.html (discussing character of Mad River Glenn, thus distinguishing it from other
ski resorts).
32. See id. (identifying how Mad River Glen is different from Alta and Deer
Valley, who are geared toward more conservative and traditional clientele).
33. See id. (explaining how Mad River Glen has a single-chair ski lift system
that is designed for skiers only). Allegedly snowboards would damage the lifts
when exiting. See id.
34. See id.  (identifying Mad River Glen as only resort with unique chair
system).
35. See Sabotage Stupidity: Burton’s Power to the Poachers, 5ONES (Jan. 16, 2008),
http://5ones.com/sabotage-stupidity-burtons-power-to-the-poachers/ (describing
5
Laudadio: This Hill Ain't Big Enough for the Both of Us: How the Feud Betwe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
540 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 535
snowboarding company’s legendary owner and creator, Jake Bur-
ton, challenged snowboarders across the country to go to any of
these three ski-only resorts, ride the hills on their snowboards, doc-
ument their experiences with a camera, and submit their record-
ings for a chance at a $5,000 cash prize.36  However, the campaign
failed to make a meaningful impact, and the three resorts continue
to ban snowboarding.37
B. From the Mountain to the Courtroom: Making a Case
Against Alta Under an Avalanche of Obstacles
The Wasatch case is notable for two reasons: (1) it focuses on
unique and contentious constitutional law issues, and (2) it effec-
tively illustrates the feud between snowboarders and skiers.38
Therefore, it provides a foundation for exploring the current status
of constitutional claims regarding equal access to land within the
context of a contemporary social battle between two distinct types
of athletes.39
1. The Legal Edge
The Alta case required the Utah District Court to apply some-
what complex, but defendant-favorable, standards for determining
whether there is sufficient state action or rational basis justifications
in Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding equal land access.40
First, equal protection only applies to government actions.  So for a
plaintiff to bring an equal protection claim against a private party,
the plaintiff must overcome the extraordinarily high burden of
showing that the state is so involved that the action may be claimed
as the state’s own.41  Moreover, the jurisprudence on state action in
Sabotage Stupidity, social media campaign started by Jake Burton, owner of one of
biggest and well-known snowboarding companies [Burton]).  Burton encouraged
snowboarders to trespass onto ski resorts where they were forbidden. See id. Bur-
ton participated in the campaign with a group of forty snowboarders who tres-
passed onto Mad River Glenn Resort on December 15, 2007. See id.
36. See id.  (noting that this act of trespassing on ski resort where
snowboarders are banned is called “poaching”). See id.
37. See id. (speculating that campaign failed either because social media use
was inadequate or because snowboarders do not care enough to change policies at
select resorts).
38. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1357, 1367
(D. Utah 2014) (discussing how state action cases are “challenging to understand
and decipher,” and how animus between skiers and snowboarders is large compo-
nent of plaintiff’s argument).
39. See infra notes 40–93 and accompanying text.
40. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1356 (discussing nature of state action
requirement for equal protection claims).
41. See infra notes 44–59 and accompanying text.
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the context of land use provides the government, and government
actors, with the additional defense that the Property Clause of the
Constitution offers virtually unlimited discretion in how to operate
land.42  Then, even if the plaintiff satisfies the state action element
and the Property Clause is inapplicable, the plaintiff in most cases
will have to overcome the equally difficult burden of showing that
the defendant had no rational reason for discriminating against the
plaintiffs.43
a. State Action Requirement
In order for a plaintiff to initiate a Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection claim against a private party, there must be a sig-
nificant amount of state action in the discriminatory practice at is-
sue such that the practice itself can be considered a state act.44
When considering whether there is sufficient state action, courts
look at two factors: (1) whether the alleged deprivation can be at-
tributed to a state actor, and (2) whether the deprivation was the
result of the actions of that state actor.45
The cause of the discrimination must be a direct state actor,
not someone acting under the authority of the state.46  In Flagg
Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, the city marshal of Mount Vernon, New York,
arranged for the plaintiff, who had been evicted, to store her be-
longings in a warehouse owned by a private company.47  After vari-
ous disagreements over pricing between the plaintiff and the
company, the plaintiff brought an equal protection claim against
the company.48  The Supreme Court of the United States held that
the company did not qualify as a state actor simply because the
42. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text.
43. See infra notes 65–70 and accompanying text.
44. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1356–57 (explaining that there must
be sufficient state action for court to even consider claim).
45. See generally Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982) (iden-
tifying general standard of review when assessing degree of state action in equal
protection claims against private entities).
46. See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164–66 (1978) (ruling that
state approval for private entity to operate does not alone satisfy state action re-
quirement for discriminatory practices).
47. See id. at 153 (recounting how the plaintiff’s eviction was the result of
failed payments on property).  The city directed her to a storage company to hold
her things while she searched for a new residence. See id.
48. See id. (reporting that the plaintiff brought action because warehouse
threatened to sell her belongings after she refused to pay asking price).
7
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company was working in unison with the city, so there was not a
sufficient connection to establish a valid equal protection claim.49
The action must also be the direct result of the state actor’s
action, not simply exist as a result of the state authorizing an actor
to operate in an otherwise legal manner.50  In Moose Lodge No. 107
v. Irvis, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to bring a claim against the Penn-
sylvania Liquor Control Board based on the racially discriminatory
policies of a club that the Board had licensed to serve alcohol.51
The court explained that even though the Board approved the
club’s liquor license, that it did not constitute Board involvement in
the non-alcohol related practices of the club.52  In other words, the
state action had no meaningful connection to the discriminatory
practices, and neither supported nor denied the practice, so the
contact was insufficient to hold the government responsible.53
Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert54 provides further gui-
dance, not only by introducing four tests available for state action
claims, but also by applying those tests to a state action claim re-
garding land access, which is the focus of Wasatch.55  In Gallagher,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that
an equal protection claim regarding private security workers em-
ployed for a concert at a public university failed because there was
insufficient state action.56  The tests the court offered were (1) the
nexus test, (2) the symbiotic relation test, (3) the joint action test,
and (4) the public function test.57  The court relied primarily on
49. See id. at 164–66 (reasoning that even though company was getting busi-
ness from government, it was still operating as private entity).
50. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175–76 (1972) (finding
that licensing by state actor to private entity does not constitute sufficient state
action).
51. See id. (explaining that lodge refused to serve African-Americans).
52. See id. (noting that liquor board only licensed lodge to sell alcohol, and
had nothing to do with manner in which lodge ran its business otherwise).
53. See id. (pointing out that liquor board had no direct impact on policy).
54. 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995).
55. See id. at 1445–47 (outlining claim brought against state of Utah for inci-
dent happening at concert held at University of Utah, and identifying four tests
established by state action case law).
56. See id. at 1448–57 (evaluating claim under four identified tests).
57. See id. (listing tests that can be employed in such cases).  The Tenth Cir-
cuit court described the four tests as follows:
[1. Nexus Test:] Under the nexus test, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
“there is a sufficiently close nexus” between the government and the chal-
lenged conduct such that the conduct “may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.”
. . . .
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the symbiotic relationship test in determining whether the fact that
a state institution hosted the event was sufficient state action to
hold the state liable for equal protection claims against security
workers.58  The court found the claim failed this test because “[t]he
fact that certain conduct occurs on public property does not estab-
lish state action.”59
b. The Property Clause Defense
Courts have found that additional protection for defendants
exists in the Property Clause of the Constitution, which states that
the government controls the rules and regulations for operating
property that the government owns.60  This defense is unique to
cases like Alta because it only applies when the claimed discrimina-
tion deals with the right to access government land.61  The jurispru-
dence regarding this defense is summed up in Light v. United
States,62 where the Supreme Court of the United States held that
under the Property Clause, the government has the right to control
its property as any other proprietor would: thus the government
can allow the property to be used in only certain ways or by certain
persons.63  Therefore, the federal government has broad discretion
as long as it is acting as a proprietor.64
[2. Symbiotic Relationship Test:] State action is also present if the state
“has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence” with a
private party that “it must be recognized as a joint participant in the chal-
lenged activity.”. . . .
[3. Joint Action Test:] State action is also present if a private party is a
“willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.”. . . .
[4. Public Function Test:] If the state delegates to a private party a func-
tion “traditionally exclusively reserved to the State,” then the private party
is necessarily a state actor.
Id. (second alteration in original) (citation omitted).
58. See id. at 1451–53 (evaluating whether state was acting in unison with pri-
vate entity to constitute interdependence).
59. Id. at 1452 (explaining that there must be more direct connection be-
tween private and public entities than simply one operating on land of another).
60. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (stating breadth of Property Clause).  The
Property Clause states that “[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and
make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so con-
strued as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.”
Id.
61. See id. (identifying power of government to control its own land).
62. 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
63. See id. at 536–37 (1911) (holding that defendant could not bring cattle
onto land owned by government and then seek judicial recourse concerning gov-
ernment’s ability to choose said land).
64. See id. (holding that government has broad discretion when acting as pro-
prietor of land).
9
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c. Equal Protection Claims Under Rational Basis Scrutiny
Barring a Property Clause or state action defense, a court will
apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to the practice at issue.65  Ra-
tional basis is the lowest and most common form of scrutiny applied
to equal protection claims.66  It is the default standard applied un-
less there is discrimination against a class based on race, national
origin, alienage, or gender.67  When a court determines that ra-
tional basis is the proper level of scrutiny, the burden is placed on
the claimant to prove that the policy or law at issue fails to meet the
rational basis standard.68  The claimant must show the government
did not have a rational purpose for imposing the contested policy,
and that the policy was not reasonably related to that purpose.69
The claimant will win if they successfully argue either of these
points, though courts generally give deference to the govern-
ment.70  However, a showing of animus alters a court’s analysis.71
Animus is hatred towards a particular class, and when it is the sole
65. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1365 (D. Utah
2014) (offering analysis of snowboarder’s claim under rational basis scrutiny had
there been sufficient state action).
66. See id. at 1360 (stating specifically that “[a]ll other rights and classifica-
tions that are subject to the Equal Protection Clause are reviewed pursuant to a
‘rational-basis’ standard, which is the least exacting level of review”).
67. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371–72 (1971) (explaining that
strict scrutiny is reserved for classifications based on race, nationality, or alienage).
See also Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725–26 (1982) (describing
intermediate scrutiny test that should be applied to cases involving classifications
based on gender).
68. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (declaring that practice is
acceptable unless plaintiff can show that there is no rational reason for practice or
policy); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (holding that government does
not have to give further justification for its policy other than rational purpose).
69. See Heller, 509 U.S. at 320 (detailing how claimant must show that govern-
ment had absolutely no legitimate interest in enacting policy).
70. See, e.g., Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109 (1949)
(holding that seemingly arbitrary regulation on advertising was nonetheless consti-
tutional under rational basis because conceivable reason existed).  The Supreme
Court specifically stated:
[The Court does] not sit to weigh evidence on the due process issue in
order to determine whether the regulation is sound or appropriate; nor
is it our function to pass judgment on its wisdom.  [The Court] would be
trespassing on one of the most intensely local and specialized of all mu-
nicipal problems if [it] held that this regulation had no relation to the
traffic problem of New York City.  It is the judgment of the local authori-
ties that it does have such a relation.  And nothing has been advanced
which shows that to be palpably false.
Id. (citation omitted).
71. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1973) (holding
that a policy aimed at disadvantaging politically unpopular class of “hippies” was
based on animus and thus overcomes rational basis scrutiny).
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impetus for a policy or law, courts will rule for the plaintiff even in
rational basis cases.72
d. Alta as a Case Study
Alta requires an in-depth consideration of the above-refer-
enced constitutional law issues, and thus serves as an appropriate
example for reviewing the typical theories applied to equal protec-
tion land access cases.73  The case law in this area has generally re-
sulted in favorable outcomes for defendants because courts give
deference to defendants when analyzing the above issues.74  The
Alta case is therefore a modern example of how these constitutional
issues are analyzed, providing ample opportunity to reconsider the
standard approaches.75
Alta is a private resort near Salt Lake City, Utah, that is permit-
ted, by the United States Forest Service, to operate on public land
in exchange for an annual fee.76  Alta’s agreement with the Forest
Service stipulates that the resort is authorized to ban those who use
ski equipment that creates an “immediate risk, causes undue dam-
age to the quality of the snow, and is not consistent with [Alta’s]
business management decisions.”77  Alta allows “various types of
skis”, but strictly prohibits snowboarding, a policy that is neither
explicitly encouraged nor prohibited by the Forest Service.78
Wasatch sought an injunction on Alta’s snowboard ban, claim-
ing that snowboarders have a constitutional right to snowboard at
Alta.79  The complaint was twofold because while Alta is a private
72. See id. (noting that finding of animus indicates that law or policy is unre-
lated to asserted interest).
73. See infra notes 76–85 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 44–70 and accompanying text (providing examples of
cases dealing with state action requirement, Property Clause defense, and rational
basis scrutiny, all of which resulted in favorable outcomes for defendants).
75. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1356–69 (D.
Utah 2014) (providing analysis of state action requirement, Property Clause de-
fense, rational basis scrutiny, and applicability of animus).
76. See id. at 1355–56 (stating that the permit fee is calculated by formula
designed by Congress).  Alta’s fee accounts for less than 1% of the Forest Service’s
annual budget. See id.  There are 119 other ski resorts that possess the same permit
as Alta. See id.  The Forest Service is not cited as an enforcer of any of Alta’s poli-
cies. See id.
77. See id. at 1355 (internal quotation marks omitted) (describing nature of
arrangement between Alta and Forest Service).
78. See id. (noting that Alta is also able to restrict sledding, tubing, and
snowshoeing).
79. See id. at 1356 (articulating Alta’s general reason for bringing claim). See
also Wasatchequality.org, supra note 18 (stating background and purpose of Wa-
satch Equality).
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resort, the slopes are situated on public land owned by the United
States Forest Service.80  Therefore, Wasatch contended that Alta’s
snowboarding ban was an equal protection violation under the
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as a due process violation under
the Fifth, due to the federal government’s involvement through the
Forest Service.81
Alta and the Forest Service filed motions to dismiss the com-
plaint, claiming Wasatch had no grounds to bring a constitutional
claim.82  Alta and the Forest Service first argued that there was a
lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Wasatch failed to show
sufficient state involvement by the Forest Service to warrant a con-
stitutional claim against the government.83  Second, they argued
that Wasatch was not seeking a right protected by the Constitution,
so there were no further grounds for a constitutional claim.84  And
finally, even with a valid constitutional claim, there was a clear ra-
tional basis for the policy banning snowboarders.85
2. The Social Edge
After more than forty years since the creation of snowboards,
Alta is the first time the snowboarding ban at ski resorts has entered
the legal realm.86  The key legal issue was whether a particular class,
snowboarders, should have equal access to public land, yet many
arguments on both sides were based on the social tensions between
snowboarders and skiers.87  Thus, Alta embodies the feud between
the two cultures and brings the issue to a public forum where both
sides can finally be heard.88
80. See id. at 1355 (explaining how Wasatch’s claim was necessarily against
both Alta and Forest Service).
81. See id. at 1356 (outlining how Wasatch’s claim was made in light of state
action requirement).
82. See id. (demonstrating that both defendants filed separate motions to dis-
miss, but essentially argued the same points).
83. See id. at 1357 (reiterating defendants’ argument that just because Alta
used public land did not mean government was involved in the policy against
snowboarding).
84. See id. at 1361 (summarizing defendants’ argument that the right to use
land for a recreational activity was not sufficient to trigger equal protection).
85. See id. at 1367 (listing Alta’s justifications such as snowboards’ detrimental
effects on the terrain of hills, differences in motions between snowboarders and
skiers, and safety concerns caused by snowboarders’ “blind spot”).
86. See Barber, supra note 16 (arguing that Alta is a new mark in feud between
snowboarders and skiers).
87. See id. (discussing how lawsuit is fueled by snowboarders’ feeling discrimi-
nated against at ski-only resorts).
88. See id. (explaining how Alta provides official forum for feud to be settled).
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Wasatch’s claim was indeed based largely on the presence of
animus.89  The Utah District Court summarized Wasatch’s position
that “Alta’s decision was based on Alta’s belief that snowboarders
are undesirable people with obnoxious habits and characteristics
and that this attitude on the part of Alta was the primary, if not the
sole, reason for the snowboard ban.”90  The strength of Wasatch’s
arguments therefore rests largely on the social undertones of the
case and whether such concerns were enough to constitute an un-
constitutional act of discrimination.91
Though Wasatch admitted to a lack of legal precedent for its
claim, it nonetheless maintained that Alta’s policy was a clear exam-
ple of discrimination against a specific class of people.92  Not sur-
prisingly, the claim sparked significant backlash from the skiing
community in support of Alta’s policy against snowboarding.93
Therefore, the Utah District Court was tasked with evaluating the
challenging constitutional issues stemming from the historic feud
between two classes of people that is just now reaching the courts.94
III. CUTTING INTO THE COURT’S DECISION IN FAVOR OF ALTA AND
CARVING NEW STANDARDS FOR REVIEW
Though the constitutional issues in this case arose within the
unique context of land access, the District Court’s opinion accu-
rately demonstrates the typical approach in equal protection cases,
ultimately ruling against Wasatch on every major point, including
the state action, Property Clause, and rational basis issues.95  The
reality is that plaintiffs face an extremely high burden at every turn,
so courts can, and do, strike down a claim on any one of the numer-
89. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1367 (describing that Wasatch’s pri-
mary policy motivation was hatred).
90. See id. (outlining Wasatch’s stance on presence of animus in case).
91. See id. (declaring that animus claim is intertwined with social tensions ex-
isting between skiers and snowboarders).
92. See Whitehurst, supra note 16.  Attorney for the plaintiffs argued, “This
case is not about equipment, it’s not about skiing and snowboarding.  It’s about
deciding you don’t like a group of people, you don’t want to associate with that
group of people, and you’re excluding them.” Id.
93. See Barber, supra note 16 (explaining how comment sections in many arti-
cles reporting on Alta case have included emotional arguments between skiers and
snowboarders).
94. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1357, 1367 (noting that state action
cases are “challenging to understand and decipher,” and how animus between ski-
ers and snowboarders is large component of plaintiff’s argument). See Barber,
supra note 16.
95. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1369–70 (summarizing holding in
favor of Alta and Forest Service).
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ous grounds discussed in the Alta case.96  However, there is consid-
erable evidence and authority that opposes much of the Court’s
reasoning, which again, reflects the norm.97  This evidence and au-
thority suggests a more equitable and plaintiff-friendly approach in
equal protection cases, warranting reconsideration of the jurispru-
dence in this area of law.98  This analysis will therefore provide a
recommendation on how to analyze the specific constitutional law
issues brought up in Alta with the backdrop of a historic rivalry that
continues to incite conflict in the winter sports world.99
A. State Action
Although state action jurisprudence on equal protection
claims generally favors defendants,  there is reason to doubt the
reasoning behind the District Court’s quick dismissal of Wasatch’s
argument.100  The court’s opinion first stated that the Forest Ser-
vice had not been meaningfully involved in Alta’s policy and was
therefore not sufficiently close to satisfy the state action element.101
It based its reasoning primarily on Gallagher, holding that the sim-
ple fact that Alta, as a private entity, was operating on public land,
was not enough on its own to warrant a finding of sufficient state
action.102  The court also cited Vincent v. Trend Western Technical
Corp.,103 where the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit ruled that state action might exist when a private entity’s
financial obligations to the state actor are an “indispensable ele-
ment in the [state actor’s] financial success.”104  Here, the District
Court explained, Alta’s permit fee constituted a mere 0.1% of the
Forest Service’s budget, making it insufficient to reach the level of
96. See id. (demonstrating how courts will approach and decide cases with
issues similar to Alta).
97. See id. at 1356–69 (noting opposition to court’s reasoning). See also infra
notes 100–211 and accompanying text.
98. See infra notes 100–211 and accompanying text (suggesting more lenient
standards for plaintiffs in equal protection cases similar to Alta).
99. See infra notes 100–211 and accompanying text.
100. See supra notes 44–59 and accompanying text (demonstrating defendant
favorability); see also infra notes 101–20 and accompanying text (showing quick
dismissal).
101. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1357–58 (holding that Forest Service
was not involved in actual policy banning snowboards).
102. See id. (reasoning that relationship existing between two parties was not
sufficient to warrant sufficient state action).
103. 828 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
104. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (citing Vincent, 828 F.2d at 569)
(describing alternative means for finding state action).
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indispensability described in Vincent, and so the claim fails on this
additional basis as well.105
However, other authority justifies a more lenient approach to
evaluating state action, which would (1) more generously consider
the role of private parties in the overall business of the state actor,
and (2) refuse to accept ignorance as an excuse from state liabil-
ity.106  In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., an equal protection
claim was brought against a restaurant in Wilmington, Delaware
that refused to serve a patron because the patron was African Amer-
ican.107  The restaurant was privately operated but located in a
building owned by the Wilmington Parking Authority, who was
found to be a state actor on behalf of Delaware.108  The Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that there was sufficient state ac-
tion in light of the specific circumstances of the case.109  Similar to
Alta, the restaurant’s only obligation to its government lessor was
the payment of fees.110  Though the payments in Burton were rela-
tively more significant to the state, the $1.7 million paid by Alta to
the Forest Service between 2009 and 2012 dwarfs the $28,700 an-
nual fees collected in Burton.111
Moreover, although there was no evidence that the Wilming-
ton Parking Authority directly supported the restaurant’s policy,
the state actor was still liable.112  Justice Clark stated that the state
may not avoid liability just because it ignores the discriminatory
105. See id. at 1358 (reasoning that annual fee’s impact was too small to be
significant).
106. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 729 (1961) (hold-
ing actions of restaurant located in public parking garage were attributable to state
actor because of integral relation); see also Thomas P. Lewis, The Meaning of State
Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083, 1100 (1960) (providing overarching discussion on
meaning and applications of state action doctrine).
107. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 716 (explaining that restaurant only served
whites).
108. See id. (noting that Parking Authority was operating on behalf of state,
and that restaurant was located within garage owned and operated by Parking
Authority).
109. See id. at 722–29 (holding that more than impact on discriminatory pol-
icy should be considered).
110. See id. at 722–23 (reporting that restaurant leased space from Parking
Authority).
111. See id. (discussing financial aspect of Alta’s lease). See also Brooke Adams,
Forest Service Says Alta Has Rational Reasons for Snowboard Ban, THE SALT LAKE TRIB-
UNE (Mar. 31, 2014, 8:31 PM), http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/news/57755544-78/
alta-forest-service-snowboarders.html.csp (discussing revenue resulting from
lease).  Note that in addition to differences due to inflation, Alta’s payment is a
three-year cumulative amount, while the restaurant’s is a yearly amount. See id.
112. See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725–29 (reasoning that Parking Authority’s direct
impact on policy was not only worthy consideration).
15
Laudadio: This Hill Ain't Big Enough for the Both of Us: How the Feud Betwe
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2016
550 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23: p. 535
practices at issue.113  He added that “[b]y its inaction, the [Parking]
Authority, and through it the State, ha[d] not only made itself a
party to the refusal of service, but ha[d] elected to place its power,
property and prestige behind the admitted discrimination.”114  Ap-
plying this reasoning to Alta, the Forest Service should not be ex-
empt from an equal protection claim simply because it did not
overtly support Alta’s snowboarding ban, contrary to the opinion of
the Utah District Court.115
Further support for this argument is found in Thomas P.
Lewis’ The Meaning of State Action, where Lewis says that a lessor of
government property should be found liable for the actions and
policies of the lessee if the land is used to fulfill a public need or
desire.116  He cites examples such as golf courses, swimming pools,
and parks, which may be leased and operated by a private entity but
run for the purpose of public enjoyment.117  According to Lewis,
the key issue is that the state actor is not selling the land, instead
leasing it to a private party for public benefit, thus integrating the
state with the purpose and policies of the land.118  As a ski resort,
Alta is a recreational site run by a private organization, but it leases
public land and operates to fulfill a public desire to engage in win-
ter sports.119  Therefore, under Lewis’ analysis, the Forest Service
would be sufficiently involved in Alta’s snowboarding ban because it
is a government lessor providing land for a private entity to fulfill a
public desire.120
113. See id. at 725 (determining that ignorance does not preclude liability).
114. See id. (explaining that allowing policy to exist was equivalent to endors-
ing it).
115. See id. (summarizing holding on ignorance); see also Wasatch Equal. v.
Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1358 (D. Utah 2014) (holding that since
Forest Service did not directly support policy against snowboarding, it was exempt
from liability).
116. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 1100 (arguing that if land is leased for public
purpose, there is state action).
117. See id. at 1101 (providing examples of recreational uses for land that ful-
fill public purpose).
118. See id. at 1102 (stipulating that state is sufficiently involved if it only leases
land as opposed to selling it).
119. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1355–56 (discussing facts of case,
including Alta’s purpose and relation to the Forest Service).
120. See Lewis, supra note 106, at 1102 (implying that since nature of relation-
ship between Alta and the Forest Service fits criteria set forth by Lewis, then there
should be sufficient state action).
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B. Standing
Before proceeding to rational basis analysis, the District Court
first addressed two challenges raised by Alta and the Forest Service
regarding standing: (1) that the right to snowboard is not a right
protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) that Article
IV (the “Property Clause”) of the Constitution precludes this type
of claim from judicial review.121  The first defense was one of the
only aspects of the case where the court agreed with Wasatch, and
so the existing standard requires little attention for the purposes of
this comment.122  However, the second defense was approached
with complete deference to Alta and the Forest Service, so explor-
ing a new standard is warranted.123
1. Zone of Interests Defense
Though Alta argued that in addition to the state action issue,
Wasatch’s claim should also be precluded because it failed to assert
a right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, the District
Court, in a rare moment, sided with Wasatch.124  Alta based its argu-
ment on Alexander v. First Wind Energy, LLC,125 in which the United
States District Court for the District of Maine ruled that a claim
against the engineers behind a wind-energy project was invalid be-
cause the claimed injury, a decline in scenic quality, was not pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment.126  Alta attempted to link
the interest in aesthetic integrity in Alexander with the interest in
recreational activity in its own case, but the court declined to adopt
the proposed line of reasoning.127  Instead, it sided with Wasatch,
holding that,
121. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1361–62 (outlining arguments re-
lated to standing brought by both defendants in effort to avoid rational basis
review).
122. See id. (ruling that Wasatch had standing to bring claim as class of one
constituting certain type of athlete).
123. See id. at 1362–65 (reasoning that Property Clause precluded claim from
being brought against Forest Service, thus voiding entire claim).
124. See id. at 1361–62 (holding that recreational activities like snowboarding
can be protected by Constitution in context of equal protection).
125. 2012 WL 681838, at *1 (D. Me. Feb. 28, 2012)
126. See Wasatch Equal. 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1361 (summarizing Alexander); see also
Alexander v. First Wind Energy, LLC, 2012 WL 681838, at *1 (D. Me. Feb. 28,
2012) (stating specifically that claimant alleged that turbines would obstruct her
view of mountains).
127. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1361. (demonstrating how Court
favored Wasatch’s argument that it was simply seeking equal protection under a
policy that directly affected snowboarders in a way that Wasatch claimed was
unfair).
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it is clear that the Equal Protection Clause has been inter-
preted to require that any action that can be properly at-
tributed to the government must be applied equally to all
persons, subject to the various levels of scrutiny explained
above. The focus is on the way the state action treats peo-
ple, not on the relative seriousness of the activities subject
to the action.128
Therefore, Wasatch had a legally sound claim that Alta’s policy fun-
damentally and thus unconstitutionally treated snowboarders differ-
ently than skiers.129
2. Property Clause Defense
Despite this finding, the District Court denied Wasatch’s argu-
ment for standing because the Property Clause of the Constitution
precluded the court from hearing equal protection claims against
the Forest Service; yet the sources cited by the court suggest a dif-
ferent outcome under a standard that goes a step further and con-
siders whether the action at issue was arbitrary.130  The Forest
Service’s relevant argument relied mostly on Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t
of Agriculture, where the Supreme Court of the United States held
that a disgruntled former government employee could not bring an
equal protection claim for being terminated for allegedly arbitrary
reasons.131  The Court said that when a state actor is functioning as
a proprietor, as opposed to a regulator, it has significant discretion
in carrying out its duties.132  Therefore, because relations between
128. See id. at 1362 (explaining why Wasatch had standing to bring equal pro-
tection claim based on type of class and interest at hand).
129. See id. (explaining further the Court’s reasoning that direct connection
to injury was key distinguishing factor between Alexander and current case).
They only seek to prove that Alta’s decision to ban snowboarders was a
decision attributable to the government that treats them differently than
other people and that it has no rational basis.  Plaintiffs’ connection to
the rule is direct (i.e., they are banned from using their snowboards at
Alta), placing them in a significantly different position than the plaintiff
in Maine whose complaint was based only on an alteration of the view she
had of the western hills.
Id.
130. See id. at 1362–65.  See also Engquist v. Oregon Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S.
591, 602 (2008) (ruling that discretionary power of state actors should apply in
context of government employment); see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S.
562, 565 (2000) (holding that because there was different standard for licensing
applied to claimant, state actor’s action was subject to review by courts).
131. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 595 (stipulating that government decisions can
generally be made with broad discretion).
132. See id. at 598 (adding caveat that government decision must be made in
context of proprietorship, which warrants broader discretion than as regulator).
18
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employers and employees in the context of hiring and firing are
inherently subjective, the discretionary powers of the state actor
may not be questioned when there is a simple difference between
treatment of individuals.133
In the current case, the court favored the Forest Service’s argu-
ment that the ruling in Engquist should be extended to cover acts
involving the government as a lessor of land.134  First, the court said
that because the Forest Service was acting as a proprietor is should
be given broad discretion.135  Further, as stated in Light, the Prop-
erty Clause grants the executive branch unlimited power over gov-
ernment property, and so there would be a clear violation of the
separation of powers doctrine if the court were to hear a claim re-
garding executive discretion regarding use of property.136
However, after looking more closely at the basis of the Su-
preme Court’s ruling in Engquist, the District Court’s extension of
the Engquist ruling to the current case seems misguided.137  The
reasoning in Engquist was based largely on Olech, where the Su-
preme Court found that when a state actor is executing its authority
arbitrarily, the state actor’s action should be subject to judicial re-
view.138  The District Court addressed the state action issue earlier
in its decision, citing statistics regarding ski resorts that lease land
from the Forest Service.139  One of those statistics revealed that Alta
was only one of 119 ski resorts that lease public land, and that its
impact on the Forest Service budget was therefore insignificant.140
Yet, Alta is the only one of those 119 resorts that prohibits
snowboarding.141  Regardless of whether there are legitimate rea-
sons for the ban, the sheer fact that Alta’s policy is a statistical
133. See id. at 603 (holding that government discretion, when acting as propri-
etor, may result in better treatment to some classes over others).
134. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1364–65 (ruling that when govern-
ment is leasing land, it is acting as proprietor, and therefore has broad discretion).
135. See id. at 1363 (stating that broad discretion applied in Alta).
136. See id. (discussing federalism issues); see also Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 536 (1911) (holding that claims may not be brought against government
regarding government’s use of its own land); see also U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2
(describing power of government over its own property).
137. See Engquist, 553 U.S. at 602–04 (relying on Village of Willowbrook v.
Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000)).
138. See Olech, 528 U.S. at 564–65 (ruling that discretion may be subject to
review when court demonstrates unreasonable level of arbitrariness).
139. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (explaining that many other
resorts lease land from Forest Service under similar terms as Alta).
140. See id. (finding that 1% contribution of Alta fees was minute).
141. See Barber, supra note 16 (identifying Mad River Glen, Deer Valley, and
Alta as only ski resorts that prohibit snowboarding); Whitehurst, supra note 16
(identifying Mad River Glen, Deer Valley, and Alta as only ski resorts that prohibit
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anomaly seems enough to indicate some degree of arbitrariness.142
Therefore, this finding should have been sufficient to allow the
analysis to proceed rather than finding additional grounds to dis-
miss the claim.143
Further support for reconsidering the general applicability of
the Property Clause can be found in Congressional Discretion under the
Property Clause where Eugene Gaetke discusses the federal govern-
ment’s ability to manage its land.144  Gaetke argues that giving the
federal government unlimited discretion when regulating its own
land is entirely justifiable because the federal government is author-
ized to act as a proprietor of its own land under the Property
Clause.145  However, the two scenarios described by Gaetke, in
which the federal government may exercise its unlimited discre-
tion, do not appear to cover policies like Alta’s snowboarding
ban.146  The first scenario occurs when the government is protect-
ing certain land by designating it as the government’s own.147
Here, the Alta mountain is clearly not in need of protection be-
cause it is used for private recreational purposes.148  The second
scenario occurs when the government is regulating the type of activ-
ity that can occur on federal land, in order to ensure that the land
is not used improperly.149  At Alta, the mountain is used for recrea-
tional winter sports, and so there is no reason to protect the land
from snowboarding when skiers are already able to use mountain
for the same recreational purpose.150  Thus, enabling the federal
snowboarding).  Since Alta is the only one of the three that leases public property,
it follows that it is the only one of the 119 lessees that has such a policy. See id.
142. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1358 (stating that Alta is only ski
resort leasing public land that has anti-snowboarding policy, thus implying that its
decision seems inherently arbitrary).
143. See id. (implying that had District Court applied alternate standard, it
would have considered more than financial impact of Alta’s fee).
144. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Congressional Discretion under the Property Clause, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 381, 384 (1981) (arguing that federal government should have un-
limited discretion only when dealing with federal land rather than land owned by
states).
145. See id. at 391–93 (arguing that Property Clause only applies to govern-
ment’s ability to regulate federal land).
146. See id. (identifying reasons for exercising discretion such as protecting
wildlife or prohibiting hunting).
147. See id. (stating that federal government has power to protect land that
has endangered wildlife or landscape).
148. See About Alta, supra note 17 (describing nature of Alta Ski Resort).
149. See Gaetke, supra note 144 (arguing that federal government can pro-
hibit or regulate practices which exist on federal land to ensure that land is not
harmed).
150. See About Alta, supra note 17 (stating Alta’s purpose). See also Taylor,
supra note 1 (describing similarity between snowboarding and skiing).  Since ski-
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government to use its unlimited discretion seems inappropriate in
this case.151
C. Rational Basis Scrutiny
Had the case proceeded, the District Court would correctly
have applied rational basis scrutiny to Alta’s policy, but its analysis
was overly deferential towards Alta and the Forest Service.152  Ra-
tional basis was the appropriate analytical framework in this case
because even if Wasatch attempted to argue for a higher level of
scrutiny, it would have had no legitimate basis for classifying
snowboarders as a “protected class” seeking a “fundamental
right.”153  Wasatch appropriately sought rational basis scrutiny for
snowboarders as a “class of one” who were simply alleging unequal
treatment.154  The District Court then correctly applied this stan-
dard, which, as mentioned before, places the burden on the plain-
tiff to demonstrate that the defendants had no legitimate interest
and that the policy promoting the interest was not reasonably re-
lated to the stated interest.155
However, the District Court accepted Alta’s numerous argu-
ments for why its policy passed rational basis scrutiny with little op-
position.156  Alta argued that its policy responded to a demand for
an exclusive environment for skiers, and so letting snowboarders
intrude would completely undermine the culture and climate of-
fered by the resort.157  The court noted that Wasatch echoed these
arguments in its own complaint, and so the rational basis burden
ing and snowboarding are very similar sports, there is no reason to believe that
prohibiting one sport, while allowing the other, protects federal land. See id.
151. See Gaetke, supra note 144 (implying that since snowboarding ban does
not appear to be protected by Gaetke’s conception of Congressional discretion
under Property Clause, ban seems to be an overextension of Congressional
power).
152. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1361–67 (D.
Utah 2014) (exemplifying the District Court giving significant deference to Alta’s
justifications for banning snowboarding).
153. See id. at 1361. (analyzing snowboarders’ classification).  Snowboarders
do not qualify under the protected classes associated with intermediate or strict
scrutiny analysis. See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text (outlining rational
basis test).
154. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1361 (explaining that class-of-one
claims are those where no protected class is being harmed, such as snowboarders
who are simply a group of athletes).
155. See supra notes 6971 and accompanying text.
156. See Wasatch Equal., F. Supp. 3d at 1363–67 (demonstrating how District
Court did not question any of Alta’s asserted interests).
157. See id. at 1367 (outlining Alta’s claim that its policy was based on certain
business model).
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was already met.158  Though Wasatch focused primarily on the pres-
ence of animus in its argument, Alta’s supposedly legitimate pur-
poses are questionable themselves.159  The anti-snowboard policy
may be reasonably related to the asserted interests, but there is
enough evidence to question the legitimacy of the asserted interests
to indicate that the court unfairly favored Alta.160
A more equitable standard here would have been for the court
to consider whether the asserted interests were rational given the
circumstances of the specific case, as opposed to generally.161  For
example, the court found Alta’s claim regarding terrain issues to be
legitimate, despite the lack of justification.162  Alta claimed that be-
cause certain terrains on its hills were inaccessible to snowboarders
specifically, it had a legitimate reason to prevent snowboarders
from using the resort altogether.163  However, as Wasatch points
out in its complaint, if Alta’s terrain argument is accurate then logi-
cally Alta would also prohibit skiers who are unable to access the
certain terrain from using the resort too, yet there is no such pol-
icy.164  Furthermore, though Alta is unique because it tends to get
more snowfall than any other resort in the area, there is nothing to
indicate that the quality of snow at Alta is itself unique or less acces-
sible to snowboarders than in comparable resorts that do allow
snowboarders.165
Next Alta claims that snowboarders cause abnormal dangers to
skiers because snowboarders have a different line of sight and move
down the hill differently.166  However, there is clear evidence refut-
158. See id. (explaining that Wasatch described Alta’s various claimed interests
in Wasatch’s complaint, hoping to demonstrate why interests were not valid).
159. See infra notes 161–69 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 156–58 (critiquing District Court’s acceptance of Alta’s
questionable claims).
161. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1365–67 (illustrating how District
Court accepted Alta’s justifications on their face, rather than evaluating whether or
not claims were tenable).
162. See id. at 1367 (showing how District Court accepted Alta’s argument that
terrain of Alta made some land more accessible to skiers than snowboarders with-
out further analyzing whether this concern was legitimate).
163. See Complaint at 74, Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d
1351 (D. Utah 2014) (No. 2:14CV00026) (articulating Alta’s claims that
snowboarders are unable to access all slopes on mountain).
164. See id. (arguing that Alta’s reasoning is one-sided and unreasonable).
165. See id. at 45–46 (providing further proof that Alta’s claim that
snowboarders are unable to access all of mountain is unfounded).
166. See id. at 73, 83–84 (explaining that snowboarders ride sideways on their
boards when going down a slope, whereas skiers face forwards at all times).
Snowboarders move down the slopes differently than skiers and are said to have a
blind spot that skiers do not. See id.  Alta argued that snowboarding would create
more danger and stress for skiers on the slopes. See id.
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ing this claim.167  Although Wasatch failed to present any counter-
argument here, since it focused on animus instead, a study
conducted by the National Ski Area Association in 2012 directly
contradicts Alta’s argument.168  According to the study, only 6.4%
of all collisions on the slopes involve skiers and snowboarders, with
alpine skiers being three times more likely to be involved in colli-
sions than snowboarders.169  Furthermore, according to a previous
study presented in 1993 at the Ninth International Symposium on
Skiing Trauma and Safety, only 2.6% of collisions involving skiers
also involved snowboarders, whereas 7.7% involved only skiers.170
In sum, “[s]nowboarders don’t appear to be making the slopes less
safe for their skiing peers . . . .”171
Finally, Alta claims it is simply managing a business under a
certain model, which the court accepted purely on the basis of “sim-
ple common sense.”172  The court stated that “[a] business, even a
skiing business on Forest Service property, enjoys the right to man-
age its business pursuant to its preferred business model, even if
others disagree with it.”173  However, the issue in this case is not a
mere disagreement over the business model, but rather a complaint
that the model is an equal protection violation based on the
model’s arbitrary exclusion of a certain class of people.174  The
court glosses over this issue, giving complete deference to Alta.175
The need to revise rational basis review has been recognized by
other commentators, who have provided alternative approaches.176
167. See Troy Hawks, Facts About Skiing/Snowboarding Safety, NAT’L SKI AREAS
ASSOC. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.nsaa.org/media/68045/NSAA-Facts-About-Ski-
ing-Snowboarding-Safety-10-1-12.pdf (presenting evidence that skiers are more
dangerous to each other than snowboarders are to skiers).
168. See id. (providing research that shows snowboarders are not significant
danger to skiers).
169. See id. (demonstrating that skiers are much more likely to collide with
each other than with snowboarders).
170. See id. (demonstrating that skiers are not in more danger with
snowboarders present on slopes).
171. Id. (concluding that snowboarders are not uniquely dangerous).
172. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1367 (D.
Utah 2014) (showing how the District Court did not provide a legal standard here,
but rather evaluated the argument on the basis of common sense).
173. See id. (demonstrating District Court’s deference to Alta in case).
174. See id. at 1356 (showing misguided reasoning, since the issue in this case
is whether an arbitrary policy violates equal protection, not whether a business
model is reasonable under common sense standards).
175. See id. at 1367 (demonstrating again defendant-favorable standards em-
ployed in case).
176. See Aaron Belzer, Comment, Putting the “Review” Back in Rational Basis
Review, 41 W. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 340–41 (2014) (arguing rational basis review
needs to be revised because courts do not require defendants to provide evidence
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One extreme approach, offered by Aaron Belzer in Putting the “Re-
view” Back in Rational Basis Review, argues that the burden of proof
should rest on the defendant, not the claimant.177  Under this ap-
proach, the defendant would have to show that the policy in ques-
tion is supported by an actual “fact-based justification” for the
policy’s resulting discrimination.178  Belzer points out that this
would only require a “minimally [more] intrusive judicial review”
than is currently required, but the difference would likely bring
more equitable results by holding defendants reasonably accounta-
ble.179  Had this standard been applied in Alta, the District Court
would have required Alta to provide more robust factual evidence
for Alta’s claimed goals, casting more significant doubt onto Alta’s
arguments.180
A more conservative proposal is made in Neelum Wadhwani’s
Rational Reviews, Irrational Results, in which Wadhwani advocates for
courts to require more narrowly tailored justifications for discrimi-
nation by defendants.181  Wadhwani argues that courts should re-
fuse to accept broad and “lofty” goals like “public health and
safety,” because accepting such goals essentially ensures that de-
fendants will always prevail under rational basis scrutiny.182  Rather,
courts should require defendants to provide more specific goals
that do not infringe on valid individual interests.183  Although Alta’s
claims were much narrower than “public health and safety,” they
in support of justifications for discrimination, and shifting burden back to defend-
ants would alleviate this issue). See also Neelum J. Wadhwani, Note, Rational Re-
views, Irrational Results, 84 TEX. L. REV. 801, 802–03 (2006) (stating that courts
accept overly broad justifications for discrimination, and so standards must be
narrowed).
177. See Belzer, supra note 176 (explaining that government would still have
ability to make laws based on classifications, just that the government would have
to show that there was reasonable justification for enacting such law).
178. See id. (asserting that government should have to show that justification
was legitimate, not just conceptually reasonable).
179. See id. (calling this revised standard “put-your-money-where-your-mouth-
is” rational basis review because it holds the government, the party enacting the
laws, more accountable).
180. See supra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.  Since many of Alta’s jus-
tifications seemed to lack factual basis, such as snowboarders imposing a unique
danger to skiers, the Belzer standard would likely result in Alta’s arguments being
struck down. See id.
181. See Wadhwani, supra note 176 (claiming that acceptance of broad justifi-
cations gives government unlimited discretion).
182. See id. (explaining that government can convince court that any justifica-
tion is valid under rational basis scrutiny when overly-broad categories are
accepted).
183. See id. (citing Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872 (1990)).
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were still broad under the circumstances which, according to
Wadhwani’s standard, the court should reject.184  For example,
Alta’s claimed interest in protecting skiers from snowboarders is es-
sentially a micro-level version of “public health and safety” in that
Alta’s interest is for the health and safety of resort guests specifi-
cally, as opposed to the health and safety of the general public.185
The District Court accepted this justification despite a lack of evi-
dence indicating that snowboarders pose any particular legitimate
threat to skiers.186  Again, a more equitable standard casts serious
doubt on Alta’s justifications since they lacked specificity and in-
fringed on the individual interests of snowboarders wanting access
to Alta’s slopes.187
D. Animus
The final issue in this case is whether animus should play a role
in the District Court’s analysis, which is the primary argument ad-
vanced by Wasatch.188  Courts regard animus individually, and so
accordingly this comment will discuss it individually as well.189
However, as subsequent analysis will demonstrate, animus is inextri-
cably intertwined with rational basis scrutiny.190  The court explains
that animus becomes a factor when animus is based upon member-
ship in a protected class or a fundamental right is at issue, which
warrants the application of intermediate or strict scrutiny analy-
sis.191  Animus did not qualify under that standard, but the court
also explained that animus may be considered if it is the sole motiva-
184. See supra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.  Alta’s claims may have
applied specifically to ski resorts, but were broad in that they cited factors such as
safety, accessibility, and customer demand as justifications without providing spe-
cific backing. See Wadhwani, supra note 177.
185. See supra notes 167–65 and accompanying text.  Alta’s claim focused pri-
marily on public health and safety at Alta.
186. See supra notes 157–65 (demonstrating through statistical research that
snowboarders pose no significant or unique threat to skiers, but rather skiers are
more dangerous to each other).
187. See supra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.  As Alta’s claims were
general, as applied to the context of ski resorts, they would be found overbroad
under the Wadhwani approach. See Wadhwani, supra note 177.
188. See Wadhwani, supra note 177 (showing that Wasatch believes that Alta’s
policy is based on disdain for snowboarders above all else).
189. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1367 (D.
Utah 2014) (analyzing animus independently from rational basis).
190. See infra notes 191–97 and accompanying text.  For the purposes of this
comment, a new standard of analyzing animus would fall under the umbrella of a
new standard for analyzing rational basis.
191. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1367–68 (describing proper role of
animus).
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tion for the discrimination practice, one of the rare instances in
which a plaintiff will succeed despite a court’s application of the
rational basis framework.192  Since the court credited the argu-
ments for the discriminatory practice, it held that there was no rea-
son to consider animus.193  However, Wasatch argued that there
was no rational basis for the discriminatory practice, or at least that
there was enough doubt to warrant a denial of Alta and the Forest
Service’s motions to dismiss.194
If a plaintiff overcomes the rational basis hurdle, then there is
enough evidence to indicate the presence of animus, yet the court
again gives complete deference to Alta.195  According to Susannah
Pollvogt in Unconstitutional Animus, one way to show that animus is a
motivating factor is to demonstrate direct bias by the creators of a
policy.196  With this strategy in mind, there appears to be a great
deal of evidence indicating bias at Alta, yet the District Court failed
to address this.197  First, there is a clear history of general animus
towards snowboarders from the skiing community that the court
chose not to consider.198  More importantly, the court discredited
evidence related specifically to Alta, concluding that the evidence
lacked a solid foundation and was insufficient to indicate clear ani-
mus in the decision to ban snowboarders.199  Yet, the evidence
paints a fairly clear picture of the animus present at Alta.200  Rather
than dismissing the evidence because it did not demonstrate that
animus was the explicit or sole impetus for a policy, courts could
provide more equitable results if they consider evidence
holistically.201
192. See id. at 1368 (citing U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528
(1973)) (providing further grounds for impact of animus).
193. See id. at 1368 (holding that Alta has sufficient arguments to satisfy ra-
tional basis).
194. See supra notes 152–69 and accompanying text.
195. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1367–69 (ruling that Wasatch’s ani-
mus argument had no standing because sources were not strong enough).
196. See Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV.
887, 926 (2012) (describing methods for demonstrating animus in equal protec-
tion cases).  Additionally, another method is to show that animus existed indirectly
based on the structure of a policy. See id.
197. See infra notes 198–211 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 1–37 and accompanying text.
199. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1368 (holding that quotes from
second-hand sources and social media outlets insufficient to indicate animus).
200. See infra notes 202–11 and accompanying text.
201. See Wasatch Equal., 55 F. Supp. 3d at 1367–69 (dismissing sources cited by
Wasatch because they did not directly link animus to creation of snowboard ban).
However, cumulatively the evidence seems to indicate a clear presence of animus.
See id.
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Alta’s ownership demonstrates clear animus.202  Upon decid-
ing to officially ban snowboarders in the 1980s, the Alta General
Manager stated that he would never allow snowboarders or even
anyone who uses snowboarding slang to ride on Alta’s hills.203  Fur-
thermore, a current owner of Alta stated that he knew that manage-
ment was simply unwilling to consider admitting snowboarders.204
Finally, another owner and former Alta Town Mayor thought it
strange and possibly unreasonable that Alta doesn’t allow
snowboarding when almost every other ski resort in the continent
does.205
In addition to the snowboarders represented by Wasatch being
“verbally assaulted and heckled” at Alta, there is also an indication
of animus shown by video documentation of numerous experiences
at Alta.206  Most telling is the comments made by skiers at Alta.207
One skier commented that he hated snowboarders simply because
they are younger and ride differently than skiers.208
Another reiterated that sentiment, stating that snowboarders
are just “too young and stupid,” to be riding at Alta.209  Finally, an-
other skier said that snowboarders are simply a different kind of
patron and therefore should not be allowed to “intermix,” with the
skiers at Alta.210  These additional comments evince the presence of
animus that may not explicitly be the impetus for the snowboard
ban, but clearly is at the foundation of Alta’s business model.211
Of course, even if the District Court acknowledged the argua-
bly clear presence of animus in this case, as Pollvogt points out,
courts may nonetheless find a law constitutional if rational basis jus-
202. See Complaint, supra note 163, at 76–85 (providing quotes from current
and former administrative personnel at Alta).
203. See id. at 76 (exemplifying attitudes regarding snowboarders).
204. See id. at 78 (exemplifying further the extent of animus).
205. See id. at 79 (arguing that ban is result of economic and social interests).
206. See id. at 82–85 (providing quotes from a video regarding snowboarders).
207. See id. at 83 (providing quotes from skiers at Alta).
208. See id. (exemplifying general hatred toward snowboarders at Alta).  Spe-
cifically, the skier said, “[s]nowboarders are assholes, teenage assholes, out of con-
trol; they can’t stop; they hit people, and then they don’t even stop to see how they
are . . . I hate snowboarders. They need to get off our mountain; get their own
mountain. This is a skiers’ mountain.” See id.
209. See id. (demonstrating desire to perpetuate snowboarding ban based on
social characteristics of snowboarders).  The skier stated, “[s]nowboarders are the
worst. That’s why I don’t ski anywhere else but here . . . I don’t ever want to see a
snowboarder near me . . . .  Snowboarders are too young and stupid . . . I would
hate it if there were snowboarders.” See id.
210. See id. (exemplifying desire to keep policy based on tradition of
exclusion).
211. See id. at 83–84 (demonstrating general, but clear, animus at Alta).
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tifications exist.212  Pollvogt explains that a heightened rational ba-
sis review may take place in such instances, but that defendants may
still prevail if courts are overly deferential.213  However, Pollvogt
cautions that courts usually discredit these other rational basis argu-
ments when clear animus is found, and so in Alta the existing ani-
mus would still likely prevail.214
IV. CONCLUSION
The Utah District Court’s ruling in Alta exemplifies the specific
analysis typically used in equal protection claims that concern state
involvement, land access, and rational basis review.215  The District
Court’s reasoning would have been more equitable if it adopted the
standards for review presented in this comment, especially consid-
ering the unique history of the feud between skiers and
snowboarders, but the Court simply maintained the status quo.216
These standards would give slightly more deference to plaintiffs in
such cases, with the potential for more equitable results.217  Unfor-
tunately, the Alta court employed the more established standards,
and thus granted Alta and the Forest Service’s motions to dismiss,
holding that Wasatch had no grounds to bring the claim.218
At a basic level the Alta court’s ruling will result in the perpetu-
ation of the feud, by ensuring that ski-only resorts will have ade-
quate grounds for defense when snowboarders try to bring claims
for equal access against them.219  Again, the District Court gave def-
212. See Pollvogt, supra note 196, at 929–30 (identifying misconceptions
among legal authorities when evaluating role of animus under rational basis
scrutiny).
213. See id. (describing how courts may evaluate justification more harshly
when animus is present, but explaining how this standard still does not guarantee
successful outcome for claimant).
214. See id. (explaining that courts usually give deference to claimants when
animus is present).
215. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 95–211. See also supra notes 24–94 and accompanying
text.
217. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text.  If the suggested stan-
dards were employed in the Alta case, Wasatch would have stood a better chance in
making its case against Alta’s policy, which appears to be discriminatory, and with-
out valid justification.
218. See supra notes 92–204 and accompanying text.  Because the District
Court employed the typical standard of review, its analysis heavily favored Alta and
the Forest Service, rendering Wasatch’s chances at success slim at best.  It is pre-
cisely this kind of uneven playing field that this comment seeks to address.
219. See supra notes 92–204 and accompanying text.  Also, ski resorts that do
allow snowboarding now have a solid foundation to ban it if they please, resulting
in more widespread discrimination.
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erence to virtually every argument put forth by Alta and the Forest
Service, so there is ample room for other defendants to make simi-
lar arguments.220  Even if future plaintiffs are able to satisfy the state
action element and overcome a Property Clause defense (highly
unlikely given this ruling), they are unlikely to prevail on rational
basis framework application given the court’s deference toward
Alta’s seemingly weak defenses.221  The real tragedy of this case is
the unlikelihood of another claim, as Alta is the lone member of
the three remaining ski-only resorts that leases public land allowing
for an equal protection claim.222  As a result, snowboarders likely
lost their only chance at legally gaining equal access to these exclu-
sive and discriminatory resorts.223
On the more general level of equal protection land access
claims involving state action, this case will provide greater footing
for defendants to prevail.224  Although state action claims can cause
confusion, this ruling clearly demonstrates that courts generally
favor the defendants.225  The court’s analysis and final conclusion
indicate that a claimant would essentially have to show (1) that the
government is all but writing the discriminatory policy to constitute
state action, (2) that the policy is extraordinarily discriminatory
under rational basis scrutiny, and (3) that the policy is outside the
scope of the government’s seemingly infinite discretion under the
Property Clause.226  This barrier seems virtually insurmountable,
and so claimants in such cases should have very low expectations
when assessing the likelihood of success.227  Defendants, on the
other hand, should expect to prevail under almost any circum-
220. See supra notes 92–204 (showing that Court gave deference to Alta and
Forest Service’s defenses).
221. See supra notes 92–204 (demonstrating extremely high bar claimants face
in cases like the current Alta case).
222. See Barber, supra note 16; Whitehurst, supra note 16 (both explaining
that Alta is only of three resorts that leases public land, justifying an equal protec-
tion claim).
223. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.  Since Alta is the only ski-only
resort with a state connection, it is the only resort susceptible to an equal protec-
tion claim. See id.
224. See id. (suggesting virtually impossible likelihood that claimants will win
in such cases under prevailing standards).
225. See Wasatch Equal. v. Alta Ski Lifts, Co., 55 F. Supp. 3d 1351, 1356 (dis-
cussing nature of state action requirement for equal protection claims).
226. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text.  Though this may slightly
overstate the actual requirements of a claimant in such cases, it illustrates the ex-
tremely unequal playing field that claimants will face.
227. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text (demonstrating that
claimants face high barrier and thus have little likelihood of getting past motions
to dismiss).
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stances.228  Therefore, unless the recommended standards or
others that are more favorable to plaintiffs are applied in equal pro-
tection land access claims, barring the requirement of intermediate
or strict scrutiny, there can be an expectation of unequal
protection.229
Gregory T. Laudadio*
228. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text (demonstrating that de-
fendants have clear upper hand in such cases).
229. See supra notes 95–211 and accompanying text.  If the prevailing stan-
dards continue, then claimants will usually fail, which will perpetuate instances of
discrimination similar to the Alta case.
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